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Freedom of Religion in the United States:
Fin de Si cle Sketchest
MICHAEL J. PERRY"
Converging developments in history, society, law, and philosophy reveal with
ever sharper clarity the audacious gamble that underlies the American
experiment TheAmericanrepublic simultaneouslyrelies on ultimate beliefs (for
otherwise it hasno right to the [human] rights bywhich it thrives), yet rejects any
fixed, final, or official formulation of them (for here the First Amendment is
clearest, most original, and most constructive).'
My aim in this Essay is not to present a detailed analysis of each issue I address.
That would require not one essay but several. My aim is only to paint suggestively,
with a broad brush. I hope these "sketches" contribute something of value to the
ongoing conversation,
among the Symposiasts and others, about freedom of religion
in the United States. 2

The First Amendment famously insists that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 3 Yet,
according to the authoritative case law-law that is constitutional bedrock for us in
the United States 4 -it is not just "Congress" but all three branches of the national
government that may not prohibit the free exercise of religion, abridge the freedom
of speech, etc. Moreover, it is not just the (whole) national government but the
government of every state that may not do what the First Amendment forbids. I have
suggested elsewhere how we can get from the text of the First Amendment, which
speaks just of Congress, to the authoritative case law.' But even if we were unable

j © 2000 Michael J. Perry.
* University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest University.
1. Os GUINNEss, THE AMERICAN HouR: A TIME OF RECKONING AND THE ONCE AND
FuTURE ROLE OF FAITH 18-19 (1993).
2. 1 am grateful to the other Symposiasts for their comments at the Symposium. I am
especially grateful to three Symposiasts and friends-Dan Conkle, Fred Gedicks, and Steve
Smith-for vigorous e-mail exchanges in the weeks after the Symposium. Those exchanges
helped me better understand some ofthe positions I defend in this Essay. Iam also grateful,
for their interest and discussion, to the Wake Forest students in my winter/spring 1999
seminar, FREEDOM OF RELGION. Finally, I am grateful to the Oxford University Press for
permission to reproduce here a few passages from my book, MICIAELJ. PERRY, REuIGION IN
POLTcs: CoNsTrrUTONAL AND MoRAL PERSPECTiVEs (1997). Comments welcome:
mperry@law.wfu.edu.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. L
4. On the idea of constitutional "bedrock," see MNcHAELJ. PERRY, WE ThE PEOPLE: THE
FOURTEENTHAMENMENT AND ThE SUPREmE COURT 20-23 (1999).
5. See id. at 10-12. On the controversial question whether the Fourteenth Amendment
was meant to make the First Amendment's "free exercise" and 'nonestablishment" norms
applicable to the states, see Kurt T. Lash, The SecondAdoption ofthe FreeExercise Clause:

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 75:295

to get from the text to the case law, it would nonetheless be constitutional bedrock
in the United States that neither the national government nor state government may
either prohibit the free exercise of religion or establish religion (or abridge "the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"). 6 .
For us Americans atthe end ofthe twentieth century, the serious practical question
is no longer whether the "free exercise" and "nonestablishment" norms apply to the
whole of American government, including state government. They do so apply. And
there is no going back. The sovereignty of the free exercise and nonestablishment
norms over every branch and level of American government-in particular, their
sovereignty over state government as well as the national government-is now, as
I said, constitutional bedrock for us in the United States. For us fin de sicle
Americans, the serious practical inquiry is what it means, or should mean, to say that
government (state as well as national) may neither prohibit the free exercise of
religion nor establish religion. An important related question: Why is it a good
thing, for us Americans-if indeed it is a good thing-that government may neither
prohibit the free exercise of religion nor establish religion?

Religious Exemptions Under the FourteenthAmendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106 (1994);
Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
NonestablishmentPrinciple, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, The Second

Adoption]. Lash argues that the FourteenthAmendment was meant to make applicable to the
states both a broad free exercise norm and a nonestablishment norm. For a recent instance of
the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to make the First Amendment's
nonestablishment norm applicable to the states, see Jonathan P. Brose, In Biiningham They
Love the Governor: Why the FourteenthAmendmentDoes Not Incorporatethe Establishment

Clause, 24 OIRO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1998). For the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
was not meant to make any First Amendment norm applicable to the states, see Jay S. Bybee,
Taking Libertieswith the FirstAmendment: Congress,Section 5, and the ReligiousFreedom
RestorationAct, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1995).
6. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation ofReligion:An Update and Response
to the Critics,60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 685, 690 (1992). "The government may not'establish'

religion and it may not 'prohibit' religion." Id. In a footnote attached to the word "establish"
McConnell explains that
[t]he text [of the First Amendment] states the 'Congress' may make no law
'respecting an establishment' of religion, which meant that Congress could
neither establish a national church nor interfere with the establishment of state
churches as they then existed in the various states. After the last disestablishment
in 1833 and the incorporation ofthe First Amendment against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, this 'federalism' aspect of the Amendment has lost
its significance, and the Clause can be read as forbidding the government to
establish religion.
Id. at 690 n.19.
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Let's begin with the free exercise norm: In the United States, what does it mean
to say that government may not prohibit the free exercise of religion? The "exercise"'
of religion comprises many different though related kinds of religious practice,
including: public affirmation of religious beliefs;7 affiliation, based on shared
religious beliefs, with a church or other religious group; worship and study animated
by religious beliefs; the proselytizing dissemination of religious beliefs or other
religious information; and moral choices, or even a whole way of life, guided by
religious beliefs.8 It is implausible to understand the free exercise norm to forbid
government to prohibit any religious practice whatsoever-including, for example,
human sacrifice. Indeed, by its very terms the norm forbids government to prohibit,
not the exercise of religion, but the "free" exercise of religion-that is, the freedom
of religious exercise. Just as government may not abridge "the freedom of speech"
or "the freedom of the press," so too it may not prohibit the freedom of religious

7. Paradigmatic instances of"religious" belief are the belief that God exists----"God" in
the sense of a transcendent reality that is the ultimate source, ground, and end (telos) of
creation-and beliefs about the nature, activity, or will of God. (Although some Buddhist
sects aretheistic, Buddhism-unlike Christianity, for example-ispredominantlynontheistic,
in the sense that Buddhism does not affirm the meaningfulness of"God"-talk. Nonetheless,
Buddhism does seem to affr the existence of a transcendent reality that is the source, the
ground, and the end of everything else. See THE EMYziNG GOD: A BUDDHIST-JEWISHCHRIsTIAN CONVERSATION (John B. Cobb, Jr. & Christopher Ives eds., 1990); in particular,
see David Tracy, Kenosis, Sunyata, and Trinity: A Dialogue with Masao Abe in THE
EMPTyING GOD:ABUDDHIST-JEWISH-CHRISTANCONVERSATION, supraat 135.)A belief can
be "nonreligious," then, in one of two senses. The belief that God does not exist is
nonreligious in the sense of "atheistic." A belief that is about something other than God's
existence or nonexistence, nature, activity, or will is nonreligious in the sense of "secular."
8. For a list of typical religious practices, see Article 6 of the Declaration on the
EliminationofAll FormsofIntoleranceand ofDiscriminationBased on Religion orBelief,
G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 172, U.N. Dox. A/36/51 (1981):
[Tihe right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include, interalia,
the following freedoms:
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and
maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials
related to the rites or customs or a religion or belief,
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals
and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by
the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest andto celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with
the precepts of one's religion or belief,
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in
matters of religion or belief at the national and international levels.
Id. (emphasis in original).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:295

exercise. 9 It is one thing to argue, as some do, that this freedom includes more than
just freedom from discrimination against religious practice. It is another thing
altogether, and insane, to suggest that the freedom of religious exercise is an
unconditional right to do, on the basis of religious belief or for religious reasons,
whatever one wants. One need not concoct frightening hypotheticals about human
sacrifice to dramatize the point. One need only point, for example, to the refusal of
Christian Science parents to seek readily available lifesaving medical care for their
gravely ill child.' Just as the freedom of speech is not a license to say whatever one
wants whenever one wants wherever and the freedom of the press is not a license to
publish whatever one wants whenever one wants wherever one wants, so, too, the
freedom of religious exercise is not-because it cannot be--a license to do, on the
basis of religious belief or for religious reasons, whatever one wants whenever one
wants wherever one wants. It is, rather, the freedom to practice-to "put into
practice"--one's religion (religious beliefs) to the extent doing so does not damage
any interest government may legitimately protect, such as human life. It bears
mention here that the international law of human rights acknowledges that freedom
of religion and conscience is not (indeed, cannot be) absolute, but only conditional.
As the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
DiscriminationBased on Religion or Beliefputs the point (in Article I, paragraph

3): "Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.""
In the United States, then, to say that government may not prohibit the free
exercise of religion neither means nor should mean that government may not
prohibit any religious practice whatsoever. Government may prohibit some religious

9. In a paper written under the supervision of my then-colleague, Steve Calabresi, Peter
Braffman has discussed the likely original understanding of the word "free" in the free
exercise language of the First Amendment. Peter A. Braffman The Original Understanding
of the Free Exercise Clause 37-38 (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
IndianaLaw Journal).

The first definition provided by [Samuel] Johnson's dictionary, which was
uniformly given by other contemporary dictionaries, is "liberty." The word
"liberty" was understood then as it is now, as "freedom," a freedom as "opposed
to slavery," a freedom as "opposed to necessity."... To understand "free" in
this sense, is to more readily understand the place of the right of "exercise of
religion" within the First Amendment. Just like the "freedom of speech" and the
"freedom of the press," the "freedom" of exercise ofreligion can be understood
as a fundamental right which precedes the social compact.... It is not a right
"granted" or "pernitted" by the sovereign, but rather an unalienable right
-guaranteed and protected by constitutional government Furthermore, it would
not be a right to licentiousness which is not bound by law, but rather a right to
be free from unjust restraints.
Id.
10. See, e.g., Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). See also
Caroline Frasier, Suffering Childrenandthe ChristianScienceChurch,ATLArIMCMONTHLY,
April 1995, at 105.
11. Declarationon the EliminationofAll Forms of Intoleranceand of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief,supra note 8, at 171.
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practices-practices that threaten one or more interests that government may
legitimately protect. Inbanning, or in otherwise impeding, by regulating, a religious
practice, however, government may not discriminate against religion-either against
one or more religions or, at the limit, against all religion. It is one thing to leave
government free to protect those interests anyjust government would want to protect
(e.g., human life); it is another thing altogether to leave government free to
discriminate against religion in the guise of protecting such an interest. Government
is not free, under the free exercise norm, to do the latter. Government may not
discriminate against religion in the guise ofprotecting an interest it may legitimately
protect. I am not ready to join, in this Essay, the debate about whether the free
exercise norm is more than an antidiscrimination norm." Whether or not it is more
than an antidiscrimination norm, the free exercise norm is an antidiscrimination
norm. 13
But what precisely does it mean to say that the free exercise norm is an
antidiscrimination norm? What does it mean to say that government may not
discriminate against religion? What sorts of actions does the free exercise norm, qua
antidiscrimination norm, forbid government to take? Although the Supreme Court
has nowhere articulated the substantive content of the free exercise norm qua
antidiscrimination norm in precisely the terms I am about to use here, those terms
best capture, in my judgment, what a majority of the Court has been trying to say in
recent years. 4 In any event, my aim, in this Part, is less to describe the Court's
understanding of the free exercise norm 5 than to delineate what seems to me to be
the most sensible understanding of the norm (quaantidiscrimination norm). In my
judgment, the most sensible understanding of the norm-the substantive content of
the norm-is twofold.
First.Imagine one or another kind of human conduct that is a religious practice
for at least some (and perhaps for all) who engage in the conduct-for example,
slaughtering an animal. Government violates the free exercise norm qua
antidiscrimination norm by banning (or otherwise impeding) such conduct if the
legislators or other officials who imposed the ban would not have done so but for,
first,the fact that the conduct is, for some, a religious practice-a practice embedded
in and expressive of one or more religious beliefs-and, second, their judgment that
the underlying religious belief or beliefs are false or otherwise problematic (e.g., unAmerican). (Perhaps the officials thinkthat all religious beliefs are false or otherwise
problematic, or perhaps they think thatjust some are.) It is one thing for government
to oppose one or another kind of conduct-for example, refusing to seek readily

12. I regret this gap in my Essay. I am inclined to believe that the free exercise norm is
more than an antidiscrimination norm.
13. As Stanley Fish's presentation of John Locke's understanding of religious tolerance
illustrates, the antidiscrimination understanding ofreligious liberty is a classic understanding.
See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible. Settling the JustBounds Between Church and State,
97 COLTM. L. REV. 2255, 2265-66 (1997).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 17-20.
15. Does "the Court" have an understanding of the free exercise norm? If there is a
dominant understanding among the Justices of the Court, is that understanding coherent? For
a masterful critique of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence, see Steven D. Smith, Free
Exercise Doctrineand the DiscourseofDisrespect,65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 519 (1994).
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available lifesaving medical care for one's gravely ill child-without regard to
whether or not the conduct is (for some) a religious practice. This the free exercise
norm (quaantidiscrimination norm) permits government to do.16 It is another thing
altogether, however, for government to oppose one or another kind of conduct
because, or in part because, the conduct is, for some who engage in it, (a) a religious
practice (b) animated by a religious belief or beliefs thought to be false (or otherwise
problematic). The latter opposition, because it is directed not at the conduct itselfbut
at the religion behind the conduct (religion thought to be false), discriminates
against, it is hostile to, the religion behind the conduct. This the free exercise norms
forbids government to do. To oppose the conduct itself is to oppose the intentional
physical acts of which the conduct consists no matter what beliefs or ideas animate
the acts; in particular, it is to oppose the acts whether or not any religious beliefs or
ideas animate them-and, so, even if no religious beliefs or ideas animate them. For
an example of a law directed not at the conduct itself but at the religion behind the
conduct, listen to Justice Scalia, speaking for the Supreme Court in 1990:
Government would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to
ban [acts or refusals to act] only when they,are engaged in for religious reasons,
or only because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be
unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of "statues that are to be used
for worship purposes," or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.17
Second. Government also violates the free exercise norm qua antidiscrimination
norm by banning (or otherwise impeding) conduct that is a religious practice for
some who engage in it if government would not have banned the conduct but for its
hostility or indifference to the religious group (or groups) for whom the conduct is
a religious practice-that is, but for its failure to include the group within the circle
of religious groups that government normally treats with active respect and concern.

(Just as a racial group might be a victim of government's racially selective sympathy
and indifference, so too a religious group might be a victim of government's
religiously selective sympathy and indifference.' 8) Legislators and other officials will
sometimes have less respect and concern for one religious group than for another.
This is inevitable, given the strangeness, to many officials, ofsome religious groups;
indeed, this is understandable, given the questionable morality of some religious

16. But cf infra text accompanying notes 23-37 (discussing the question of required
exemptions).
17. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990). Note that it would make no
sense, it would be naive and even foolish, to forbid government to ban "the casting of 'statues
that are to be used for worship purposes"' while leaving government free to deny to persons,
because they cast such statues, a benefit it would otherwise give to them.
The so-called "symbolic speech" cases have yielded an analogous approach. Imagine one
or another kind of human conduct that is an act of communication for at least some who
engage in the conduct-for example, burning an American flag. Government violates the core
of the free speech norm by banning (or otherwise impeding) such conduct if government
would not have done so but for its hostility to the conduct as an act of communication. See,
e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
18. On "racially selective sympathy and indifference," see Paul Brest, Foreword: In
Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
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groups (e.g., Christian white supremacists). Nonetheless, ifgovernmentwants toban
conduct that is a religious practice for some who engage in it, the free exercise norm
requires that government do so for some reason other than diminished respect and
concern for, much less outright hostility to, the religious group for whomthe conduct
is a religious practice. By "diminished" respect and concern, I mean less respect and
concern than government shows other, more familiar and popular religious
groups-or less respect and concern than government would show such a group if
one of the group's practices (e.g., the sacramental use of wine at Mass)19 would
otherwise be snared in a legislative or regulatory ban. In 1993, in a case whose facts
illustrate the problem addressed in this paragraph, the Supreme Court referred to the
requirement sketched here as a "nonpersecution principle."2
More precisely, the Court referred to that part of the requirement concerned with
hostilityto religious minorities as a nonpersecution principle. As I have sketched it,
however, the requirement does not distinguishbetween "hostility" and "indifference"
to a religious minority. Should the requirement make that distinction-and target
only "hostility?"
Imagine three different attitudes, conjoined with correspondingbehavioral choices:
(1)1 dislike them (a religious minority) so much, because of their offensive beliefs
about the nature of God, that I will, at an opportune moment, go out of my way to
harn them.
(2) 1 dislike them, not enough to go out of my way to harm them, but enough not
to go out of my way to help them if/when they are in trouble.
(3) I don't dislike them. But I don't like them either. I'm indifferent to them. So
I certainly won't go out of my way to help them if/when they are in trouble.
Attitude (1) is fairly described as "hostility"; attitude (2) is fairly described as
"hostility" too, albeit of a weaker sort than attitude (1); and attitude (3) is fairly
described as "indifference." Now, I don't think that there's much moral difference
between attitude (2) and attitude (3). (Do you?) But let's put that point aside. The
more important point, in this context, is that there is no reason to thiink that judges
can excavate the relevant facts so thoroughlythat they can confidently identifywhich
legislative restrictions on a religious practice-in particular, which legislative
refusals to exempt a religious practice from an otherwise applicable restriction-are
animated by attitude (2) rather than by attitude (3) and which are animated by
attitude (3) rather than by attitude (2).21 The most sensible specification of the free

19. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60.
20. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,523 (1993).
21. In particular, there is no reason to think thatjudges can excavate the relevant facts so
thoroughly that they can confidently identify which legislativerefusals to exempt a religious
practicefrom otherwise applicable restrictionsare animated by attitude (2) and which are
animated by attitude (3). See infra text accompanying notes 23-38 (discussing exemptions).
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exercise norm qua antidiscrimination norm, therefore, is one that does not put any
weight on-that does not require judges to play with-the distinction between
"hostility" and "indifference."

What does it mean to say that government may not discriminate against
religion-or, equivalently, that the free exercise norm is an antidiscrimination
norm? The answer is twofold. Government may not oppose one or another kind of
conduct either
(1)because, or in part because, the conduct is, forsome, (a) a religious practice (b)
animated by a religious belief or beliefs thought to be false or otherwise
objectionable, or
(2) because, or in part because, of hostility/indifference to the religious group (or
groups) for whom the conduct is a religious practice---because of a failure to include
the group within the circle of religious groups that government normally treats with
active respect and concern.
3

Although it is widely accepted that the free exercise norm is an antidiscrimination
norm, it is controversial whether the free exercise norm is more than an
antidiscrimination norm. There is disagreement, both on the Supreme Court and off,
about whether the norm forbids government to do anything other than discriminate
against religious beliefs or religious groups. According to the Supreme Court, the
free exercise norm forbids government only to.discriminate against religious beliefs
or religious groups.22 As Professors Eisgruber and Sager have observed
(approvingly), the Court is
best understood as emphasizing a deep point about the conceptual structure of

religious liberty, not simply a view about how much religious liberty is desirable
or how it competes with other constitutional and political values. The point is
this: the only sound conception of religious liberty is founded upon protecting
religious exercise against persecution, discrimination, insensitivity, or hostility.'

However, the Supreme Court misconceives the import ofthe proposition that the free
exercise norm is only an antidiscrimination norm.
Recall that one way government can violate the free exercise norm qua
antidiscrimination norm is by banning (or otherwise impeding) conduct (i.e.,
conduct that is a religious practice for at least some who engage in it) that
government would not have banned but for its hostility/indifference to the religious

22. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
23. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, CongressionalPowerandReligious

Liberty after City of Boeme v. Flores, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 104 (emphasis in original).
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group whose conduct is banned, but for its failure to include the group within the
circle of religious groups that government normally treats with active respect and
concern. However, even if government action banning a religious practice--that is,
even if government's refusal to exempt a religious practice from a ban to which the
practice is subject-is in fact based on diminished respect and concern for the
religious group whose practice is banned, it can be difficult to the point ofimpossible
for a litigant to establish that fact directly-or for a court to discern that fact
directly.24 A sensible judicial response to this problem of proof is to allow for the
possibility of establishing and discerning indirectlythat the challenged government
action is based on, that it presupposes, diminished respect and concern for the
religious group whose practice is banned. How to do that? By means of this rule: If
government could exempt a religious practice from a ban to which the practice is
subject without seriously compromising either the objective the ban is designed to
serve or any other important governmental objective, ' but government nonetheless
refuses to do so, it shall be presumed that the refusal is based on diminished respect
and concern for the religious group whose practice is banned.26 Note that this rule
does not compete with, it does not go beyond, the antidiscrimination understanding
ofthe free exercise norm. Rather, the rule is simply a practical way of implementing
the antidiscrimination understanding of the free exercise norm; it is a way of
implementing the antidiscrimination understanding in the context of adjudication,
where problems of proof are a central concern. The proposed rule presupposes that
what is reasonable to suspect-here, the possibility that a legislative refusal to
exempt a religious practice is animated by diminished respect and concern for the
religious group whose practice it is-is not always easy to establish/discern directly.
The Supreme Court, in Employment Division v. Smith," refused to follow the
rule-the approach-sketched here: After observing that Oregon's criminal ban on
the use of peyote was not meant to discriminate against Native American religious
practice or against members of the Native American Church, the Court refused to
inquire whether Oregon had adequate reason not to exempt from its ban the

24. For an informed, thoughtful discussion of this problem ofproof, see Douglas Laycock,
ConceptualGulfs in City ofBoeme v. Flores, 39 WM. &MARYL. REv. 743, 771-80 (1998).
25. By "important" governmental objective, I mean principally the protection of "the
public safety, order, health, and morals" or of"fundamental rights and freedoms." According
to Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in BASIC
DoCUMmNTs ON HUMAN RIGrrrs 125 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1992), which the United States
ratified in 1992, "Everyone shall have ihe right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief ofhis choice,
and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching." Article 18 then
states: "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." Id.
26. Cf.Laycock, supranote 24, at 747. "[The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993]
excused the plaintiff from the obligation to prove bad motives or overt discrimination, and
instead required the state to justify the burdens placed on religion by facially neutral laws."
Id. Laycock was one of the principal drafters of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
27.494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American Church. (The Court
did not always refuse to follow the approach sketched here; eighteen years earlier,
in Wisconsin v. Yoder,2" the Court didfollow it: The Court concluded that, although
Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law was not meant to discriminate
against Amish practice or against the Amish themselves, Wisconsin nonetheless did
not have adequate reason to refuse to exempt Amish children who had completed the
eighth grade from the law's requirement that they attend school until they reached
the age of sixteen.) In the Court's view,29 and in the view of some scholars,' the
approach recommended here competes with the position that the free exercise norm
is only an antidiscrimination norm-the position that the norm does not do more
than forbid government to discriminate against religious beliefs or religious groups.
But the Court, and the scholars, are mistaken: again, the approach at issue here does
not compete with, but indeed implements, and thereby protects, the free exercise
norm qua antidiscrimination norm.
Michael McConnell and Justice O'Connor have each argued that there is support
in the historical record ("originalist" support) for interpreting the free exercise norm
to require government to exempt a religious practice from an otherwise applicable
legal ban, or other legal impediment, unless there is a sufficiently good reason not
to do so.31 Others, however, including Justice Scalia, have disputed this reading of
the historical record. 2 But even if McConnell and O'Connor33 are wrong, all that
follows is that the historical record does not support the proposition that government
should exempt a religious practice unless there is a sufficiently good reason not to
do so. However, this conclusion does not challenge my point that a sensiblejudicial
response to the problem of proof identified above is to permit litigants to establish
indirectly, and courts to discern indirectly, that the challenged government action is
based on, that it presupposes, diminished respect and concern for the religious group
whose practice is banned-and to do this by means of the rule that if government
28. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
29. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
concurring); Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
30. See Christopher L. Eisgruber &Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability ofConscience:
The ConstitutionalBasisforProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. CHI L. REV. 1245, 1268
(1994) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience]; Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1995); Eisgruber & Sager, supranote 23.
31. McConnell and O'Connor have focused on the record of the founding period of the

United States. See City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,joined in part
by Breyer, J., dissenting); Michael W. McConnell, The OriginsandHistoricalUnderstanding
ofFreeExerciseofReligion, 103 HARV. L. Rv. 1309 (1993). Kurt Lash has argued that even
if the record of the founding period does not offer the support that McConnell and O'Connor
think it offers, the record ofthe period leading up to the Civil War and beyond to the adoption
ofthe Fourteenth Amendment-Section 1 ofwhich makes the free exercise norm of the First
Amendment applicable to the states-does offer support for the exemption interpretation of
the free exercise norm. See Lash, The SecondAdoption, supra note 5.
32. See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
concurring in part); Philip A. HamburgerA ConstitutionalRightofReligiousExemption:An
HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992).
33. And Lash. See Lash, The Second Adoption, supranote 5.
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could exempt a religious practice from aban to which the practice is subject without
seriously compromising either the objective the ban is designed to serve or any other
important governmental objective but nonetheless refuses to do so, it shall be
presumed that the refusal is based on diminished respect and concern for the
religious group whose practice is banned. As I said, this rule does not compete with,
it does not go beyond, the antidiscrimination understanding ofthe free exercise norm
but rather implements that understanding. If the proposed rule is in fact a sensible
way for the judiciary to protect the free exercise norm from some violations that
would otherwise be too difficult (or too costly) to detect, then no constitutionaltheoretical consideration stands in the way of the Supreme Court adopting the rule.'
But is the proposed rule as sensible as I suggest? Consider the following
hypothetical. The legislature of the State ofAppalachiais deliberating about whether
to ban the ingestion of all alcoholic beverages. It has not yet decided whether to do
so, but it has decided that ifit does so, it will exempt the sacramental ingestion of
wine at Mass. On another front, the legislature has just banned the ingestion of all
hallucinogenic substances, including peyote. Moreover, despite pleas to do so, the
legislature has refused to exempt the sacramental ingestion of peyote by members of
the Native American Church. Is the legislature's refusal animated by
hostility/indifference? Assume that it is open to serious question whether granting
the exemption would seriously compromise either the objective the ban is designed
to serve or any other important governmental objective. Which is more sensible, as
a practical matter: (1) an approach that would require a litigant to establish directly,
and a court to discern directly, the presence of such hostility/indifference? Or (2) an
approach that would test the reasonable suspicion of such hostility/indifference by

34. Indeed, one would have thought that Congress, too, which is charged under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment with protecting (among other things) the free exercise norm,
was free to codify such a rule. And, indeed, Congress, with the support of President Clinton,
did codify a strong version ofthe rule (perhaps too strong a version) in the Religious Freedom
RestorationAct of 1993 ("RFRA"). 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (1994). According to subsection 1(a)
of RFRA: "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection
(b).. . ." Id. According to subsection 3(b): "Government may substantially burden aperson's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest." Id. In 1997, however, the Supreme Court
ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional because in excess of Congress's power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. That is, RFRA is
unconstitutional, as applied to state government. For a decision that RFRA is not
unconstitutional as applied to the federal government, see Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998). In myjudgment, the
Court was wrong. I concur in the judgment of the two most formidable religious liberty
scholars of their generation, Douglas Laycock and Michael McConnell, that RFRA is not
unconstitutional. See Laycock, supra note 24; Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation:A CritiqueofCity ofBoere v. Flores, 11 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1997); see also
Bonnie L Robin-Vergeer, Disposingofthe RedHerrings:A Defense ofthe ReligiousFreedom
RestorationAct, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996). The scholarly literature on RFRA-and, in
particular, on the constitutionality vel non of RFRA-is enormous. See, e.g., Symposium:
Reflections on City of Boemne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 601-960 (1998).
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having the court inquire whether granting the exemption would seriously
compromise either the objective the ban is designed to serve or any other important
governmental objective?
The fundamental question here, I think, is twofold: How skeptical of ordinary
politics, how distrustful, ought we to be when it comes to the protection of religious
minorities? And how vigorously ought we to want the judiciary to protect, against
discrimination, religious minorities and their religious practice? My answer to the
first question: very skeptically. My answer to the second: very vigorously. Not that
I hold out much hope that the judiciary-including Supreme Court justices-would
often act vigorously in protecting religious minorities even if they followed the
approach I recommend here. Our historal experience suggests that they would not.35
Nonetheless, the approach I recommend here would open a doctrinal space for the
judiciary to protect one or another religious minority more vigorously at least once
in a (long?) while. Something Doug Laycock said comes to mind: "Some of the time,
judicial review will do some good. Judges did nothing for the Mormons, but they
may have saved the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish. If judges can save one
religious minority a century, I consider that ample justification for judicial review
in religious liberty cases." 6
I conclude, therefore, that even if the Supreme Court is right that the free exercise
norm is only an antidiscrimination norm, the Court is wrong to refuse to follow the
practical approach proposed here, according to which government must exempt a
religious practice from a ban if it can do so without seriously compromising either
the objective the ban is designed to serve or any other important governmental
objective. That approach-that rule--does not compete with, but indeed implements,
and thereby protects, with appropriate vigor, the free exercise norm qua
antidiscrimination norm.
A final point. An unfortunate cost attends the Court's refusal to follow the
proposed approach: in refusing to follow that approach-an approach that does not
require a direct showing ofdiscrimination (hostility, prejudice, indifference) but only
a showing that government could have exempted without incurring serious
costs-the Court is constrained to follow instead, as Steve Smith has aptly
characterized it, "a doctrinal path that leads to a constitutional discourse in which
contending parties accuse each other of hostility, persecution, and bad faith....
[T]his sort of demonizing debate is precisely what a doctrinal emphasis on motive
as a dispositive factor is calculated to elicit."37 Smith's wise recommendation,
elegantly defended in a masterful essay: "[I]f one is searching for alternatives, then
,.

.

the discourse of humility and tolerance exemplified in [Wisconsin v. Yoder]

invites renewed consideration."' Again, in Yoder the Court didfollow the approach
recommended here."

35. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The End ofFree Exercise?, 42 DEPAuLL. REV. 567 (1992).
36. Douglas Laycock, The Benefits ofthe EstablishmentClause,42 DEPAULL. REV. 373,
376 (1992).

37. Smith, supra note 15, at 575-76.
38. Id. Smith discusses, and applauds, the Court's performance in Wisconsin v. Yoder at
various points in his essay.
39. Does the approach recommended here-the approach the Court followed in
Yoder-privilege religion over nonreligion in violation of the nonestablishment norm? I turn
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4
The question whether we Americans should want the free exercise norm to be part
of our constitutional law is not controversial. It is widely agreed that it is a good
thing that the free exercise norm-that is, the prohibition on government
discriminating against either unpopular religious beliefs or unpopular religious
minorities-is part of our constitutional law. The principal general reason why it is
a good thing derives from our historical experience: the possible costs of leaving
government free-of leaving the politically powerful free-to target unpopular
religious beliefs/minorities as such, we have learned from history, are terrible. As our
historical experience discloses, political acts of discrimination against religion, in
the United States as elsewhere, have been bigoted in inspiration, repressive in aim,
and cruel in practice.' Moreover, a politics free to attack religion is a politics free
to try to secure favors from one or more religions-including the favor of
genuflecting before the politically powerful-in return for the promise of not
attacking the religions. What an ugly state of affairs that would be: some religions
savaged and some other religions bought off.
Why, then, leave government free to discriminate against religion? There is no
good reason. There is simply no need for government in the United States to be free
to discriminate againstreligion. Itis entirely sufficient that government may regulate
conduct without regard to whether or not the conduct is (for some) a religious
practice. It is utterly unnecessary to the achievement of any goal proper to
government that it be free to disfavor religious beliefs/minorities as such. We
Americans now understand that nothing ofreal value is lost-but something of real
value is gained-by forbidding government to discriminate against religion.
Of course, every particular reason for affirming the free exercise norm as part of
our constitutional law is only one ofmany possible reasons. The reason (or reasons)
that one person, with his experience and beliefs, will feature will be different from
the reason that another person, with her experience and beliefs, will feature. (What
is practically important is that the different reasons converge on the same political
arrangement: a constitutional commitmentto the ideal offree exercise.) Some people
will feature a religious or theological rationale for the free exercise norm.11 One such
rationale, toward which I can only gesture here, is this: It is a profoundly good thing
for human beings to achieve religious truth (i.e., to come as close as they can to
achieving it), a truth that is existential as well as intellectual; and, given all that we
have learned to this point about human beings and their societies and rulers, it now
seems clear that political conditions of religious authoritarianism and coercion are
much inferior to political conditions ofreligious freedom as a path to religious truth.
(That no path to religious truth is easy or sure does not entail that no path is better
to that question below, see infra text accompanying notes 57-67.
40. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LusTE oF OuR COUNTRY: THE AMmuCAN
EXPERIENCE OF REUGIOUs FREEDoM ch. 2 (1998) (entitled "To Kill a Quaker, to Beat a
Baptist-Religious Liberty Before the Revolution").
41. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, An Anti-LiberalArgument for Religious Freedom, 7 1.
CONTmP. LEGALIssuEs 275 (1996). For a discussion of the Catholic Church's post-Vatican
II answer to the question, see NOONAN, supra note 40, ch. 13 (entitled "The Light of
Revelation and the Lustre of America").
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than another.) In our religiously pluralistic society, however, the
nonreligious/nontheological rationale sketched in the preceding paragraph has the
obvious virtue of being relatively nonsectarian-a rationale that unites many
religious believers and nonbelievers alike. Although I myself embrace, in addition
to the nonsectarian rationale, the religious/theological rationale toward which I have
gestured in this paragraph, I also agree with Doug Laycock-as against, for
example, John Garvey-that "[r] eligious liberty does not presuppose that religion is
a good thing."42 The nonsectarian rationale for the free exercise norm does not
presuppose that religion is a good thing-or that it is a bad thing or an indifferent
thing.
5
Let's now turn to the other constituent of the American constitutional law of
religious freedom: the nonestablishment norm. In the United States, what does it
mean to say that government may not establish religion? Whereas the free exercise
norm forbids government to discriminate against religion, the nonestablishment
norm forbids government to discriminate in favor of religion.' In particular, the
nonestablishment norm forbids government to discriminate in favor of membership
in one or more churches or other religious communities or in favor of the practices
or tenets of one or more churches. No matter how much some persons might prefer
one or more religions, government may not take any action based on the view that
the preferred religion or religions are better along one or another dimension ofvalue
than one or more other religions or than no religion at all. (For present purposes,
government takes action "based on" a view if it would not have taken the action but
for that view.) So, for example, government may not take any action based on the
view that Christianity, or Roman Catholicism, or the Fifth Street Baptist Church, is
closer to the truth than one or more other religions or churches or than no religion
at all-or, if not necessarily closer to the truth, at least a more authentic reflection
of the religious history and culture of the American people. (One might believe that
by reflecting the religious history and culture of a people, laws and other political
choices achieve a moral authority they would otherwise lack and help to maintain
a useful sense of moral solidarity among the people.)
Similarly, no matter how much some persons might prefer one or more religious
practices, government may not take any action based on the view that because the

42. Douglas Laycock, ReligiousLibertyasLiberty, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGALISSUES 313, 313
(1996). Laycock offers what he calls a "religion-neutral case for religious liberty."Id at 31619. Cf KENT GREENAWALT, PRivATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 128 ("[O]ne must
present grounds for the [proposed principle of restraint] that have appeal to persons of
religious and ethical views different from one's own.").
43. Government is disabled, as well, from discriminating in favor of atheism or antireligious ideologies. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("We agree of
course that the State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion to
those who do believe."') Cf GREENAWALt, supranote 42, at 63 (stating it "assum[es] that a
principle of restraint against reliance on religious grounds would also bar reliance on
antireligious grounds").
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preferred practice or practices are religious, or because ofthe particular religion they
embody, they are better-truer or more efficacious spiritually, for example, or more
authentically American-than one or more other religious or nonreligious practices
or than no religious practice at all. Government may not take any action based on the
view that the Lord's Prayer is better than one or more other prayers or than no prayer
at all. Nor (to give another example) may government subsidize the casting of
"statues that are to be used for worship purposes" or give to persons, because they
cast such statues, a benefit it would otherwise deny to them.
Finally, no matter how much some persons might prefer one or more religious
tenets--one or more tenets about the existence, nature, activity, or will of
God-government may not take any action based on the view that the preferred tenet
or tenets are truer or more authentically American or otherwise better than one or
more competing religious or nonreligious tenets. For example, government may not
take any action based on the view that the Roman Catholic doctrine of apostolic
succession (which is, whatever else it is, a doctrine that presupposes that God exists
and makes a claim about God's activity and/or will) is closer to the truth than one
or more competing theological or nontheological doctrines. 4
The general answer I have just given, to the question what (in the United States)
it means to say that government may not establish religion, requires immediate
modification. We can imagine two versions of the nonestablishment norm: a radical
version and a moderate version. According to the radical version, government may
not take any action based on the view that one or another religious belief is truer (or
otherwise better) than one or another other competing religious or nonreligious
belief. It is inconsistent with the radical version ofthe nonestablishment norm that
"under God" is part ofthe Pledge of Allegiance, that "In God We Trust" appears on
our money, and that proceedings of the Supreme Court begin with "God save the
United States and this Honorable Court."45 The radical version is not the American
version of the nonestablishment norm, because it is widely accepted in the United
States-and, indeed, there is no constitutional case law to the contrary-that it is not
unconstitutional that that "under God" is part ofthe Pledge, that "In God We Trust"
appears on our money, or that proceedings of the Supreme Court begin with "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court." 6 Indeed, as the Supreme Court

44. My reference in the preceding two sentences is principally to religious tenets other
than religiously based tenets about the morality of human conduct Should religiously based
tenets about the morality of human conduct be treated differently under the nonestablishment
norm? See infra note 52.
45. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) ("In the very courtrooms in which the
United States District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard and decided this case, the
proceedings opened with an announcement that concluded, 'God save the United States and
this Honorable Court.' The same invocation occurs at all sessions of this Court.").
46. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement ofthe Supreme Court's
Law ofReligiousFreedom:
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 581, 603-04 & n.82 (1995). In
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), Justice Scalia derided
the bold but unsupportable assertion (given such realities as the text of the
Declaration of Independence, the national Thanskgiving Day proclaimed by
every President since Lincoln, the inscriptions on our coins, the words of our
Pledge ofAllegiance, the invocation with which sessions ofour Court are opened
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observed in 1952, "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."47

Unlike the radical version, the moderate version of the nonestablishrnent norm
contains an exception. According to the moderate version, government may affirm
a certain few very basic religious beliefs, but government may do so only
noncoercively. In affirming the beliefs-and, in that sense and to that extent, in
discriminating in favor ofreligion-government may not coerce any person to affirm
the beliefs, nor may it coerce any person to attend a religions service in which the
beliefs are affirmed or otherwise to lend supportto the beliefs (e.g., financial support
in the form oftax dollars). "It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise ....

(More about all that later.) The excepted beliefs are

these: there is a God, who created us and who both loves us and judges us; 9 and
because God created us and loves us, we are all sacred (inviolable, ends in ourselves,
etc.). This is not to say that government does not violate the nonestablishment norm
unless it acts coercively;5" according to the moderate version ofthe nonestablishment
norm, government violates the norm, whether or not it acts coercively, if it affirms
any religious beliefs beyond the excepted beliefs. The point, rather, is that
government may not affirm even the excepted beliefs unless it does so
noncoercively
As it happens, the moderate version, not the radical version, is the American
version of the nonestablishment norm. The moderate version, but not the radical
version, accounts for the fact that "under God" in the Pledge, "In God We Trust" on
our money, and "God save... this Honorable Court" at the beginning ofproceedings
of the Supreme Court are all widely accepted to be constitutional. As this fact
reflects, no generation of "We the People" ever established, as part of our
constitutional law, the radical version of the nonestablishment norm; nor did the

.. ) that government may not "convey a message of endorsement of religion.
Id. at 29-30 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J., dissenting).
47. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
48. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
49. The "us" is all human beings and not, for example, just us Americans.

50. Coercion is not an essential element of a nonestablishment violation. See School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
[IMt is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The
distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation ofthe Free Exercise
Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need
not be so attended.
Id.
51. It is a good thing that coercion is not an essential element of a nonestablishment
violation. See Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercionand the EstablishmentClause, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REv. 463 (1994); see also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,
59 U. Cmi. L. REv. 115, 157-65 (1992). According to McConnell, "an emphasis on coercion
could tend toward acquiescence in more subtle forms of governmental power. . . . If
interpreted strictly, the coercion test would increase the power and discretion ofmajoritarian

institutions over matters of religion." Id. at 159 (emphasis in original).
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radical version ever become part of our constitutional bedrock.52 At the beginning of
this Essay, I noted that it is constitutional bedrock for us that government may not
establish religion. But it is not self-evident what it means to say that "government
may not establish religion." There is, as I said, a moderate version and a radical
version of the nonestablishment norm. It is the moderate version of the
nonestablishment norm, not the radical version, that seems to be part of our
constitutional bedrock.

6
Recall the approach I recommended earlier in this Essay, an approach that does
not compete with, but rather implements, the antidiscrimination understanding of
the free exercise norm: Government must exempt a religious practice from a ban to
which the practice is subject if government can do so without incurring serious
costs-that is, without seriously compromising either the objective the ban is
designed to serve or any other important governmental objective. Although, as I
reported earlier, the present Supreme Court has chosen not to follow this approach,
the Court has ruled that government, in a generous effort to create more rather than
less space for religious practice, may exempt a religious practice from aban to which
the practice would otherwise be subject' (Presumably government would not opt to
exempt a religious practice from a ban unless it thought it could do so without
incurring serious costs.) Of course, one will not agree that government must exempt
a religious practice from a ban to which the practice is subject if government can do
so without incurring serious costs, unless one agrees that government may exempt
a religious practice from a ban to which the practice is subject if government can do
so without incurring serious costs. The claim that government must exempt, if it can
do so without incurring serious costs, presupposes that government may exempt; the
claim is that government's failure to exempt in a particular instance, if it can do so

52. The first part of the constitutional text-the Preamble-declares:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.
U.S. CONST. Preamble. In American constitutional culture, few if any persons-even,
remarkably, few if any constitutional theorists-disagree that the Constitution comprises at
least some directives issued by-that is, some norms "ordained and established" by--"C
We
the People." More to the point, few disagree that the Constitution comprises some such norms
partly because the norms were "ordained and established" by "We the People." It is now a
convention-an axiom--ofAmerican constitutional culture that "We the People ofthe United
States" not only "do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States ofAmerica"
but may ordain and establish it. This is not to say that only "We the People" may establish
norms as constitutional. Nor is it to deny that a norm never established as constitutional by
"We the People" can become constitutional bedrock for us. For a discussion of all this, see
PERRY, supra note 4, at 15-23.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
54. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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without incurring serious costs, is discriminatory. But if one rejects the
presupposition-if one believes that government may not exempt, even if it can do
so without incurring serious costs-then one will understand government's failure
to exempt in a particular instance not as discriminatory, but as compliant with the
rule that government may not exempt. As it happens, some constitutional scholars
do reject the presupposition; they argue that government may not exempt a religious
practice from a ban to which the practice is subject even if government can do so
without incurring serious costs; in their view, such an exemption privileges religion
over nonreligion-it privileges religiously based practice over practice that is not
religiously based-in violation of the nonestablishment norm.5' (Among sitting
Supreme Court justices, only Justice Stevens has embraced this position.6) We can
all agree that some governmental exemptions of a religious practice violate the
nonestablishment norm.57 The serious question is whether each and every
governmental exemption of a religious practice qua religious practice necessarily

55. See Frederick Mark Gedicks,An Unfirm Foundation:The RegrettableIndefensibility
ofReligious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. Lrrl= RocKL.J. 555 (1998); Eisgruber & Sager, The
Vulnerability ofConscience, supranote 30.
56. See City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
is not alone among modem Justices in embracing the position. See Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring inresult) ("[-]aving chosento [provide for
conscientious objection for religious objectors, Congress] cannot draw the line between
theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other. Any
such distinctions are not, in my view, compatible with the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment."). The prevailing judicial view is that, within limits, see supra text
accompanying notes 31-34, government may exempt a religious practice from a ban to which
it is subject. See, e.g., Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop ofthe ChurchofJesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). As Doug Laycock has observed,
"the Supreme Court has unanimously rejected the claim that regulatory exemptions for
religion violate the Establishment Clause." Laycock, supra note 42, at 332 (citing
Corporationof the PresidingBishop).
57. Government's discretionto exempt is not unlimited. In TexasMonthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
for example, the challenged statute exempted from sales and use taxes ''[p]eriodicals that are
published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating
the teachings ofthe faith and books that consist wholly of'writings sacred to a religious faith."
489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). A plurality of the Court reasoned that the exemption lacked
sufficient breadth to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. Every tax
exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing
them to become "indirect and vicarious'donors.'... [W]hen government directs
a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not required by the Free
Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiariesmarkedly or cannot
reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free
exercise of religion . . .. it "provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to
religious organizations" and cannot but "conve[y] a message of endorsement" to
slighted members of the community.
Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added) (quoting CorporationofPresidingBishop, 483 U.S. at 348
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original)). For a helpful articulation ofcriteria
for the "permissible" accommodation of religious practice, see McConnell, supranote 6, at
698-708.
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violates the nonestablishment norm-for example, the statutory exemption, during
Prohibition, of the sacramental use ofwine at Mass,58 or the Department ofDefense's
exemption of the sacramental ingestion of peyote by members of the military who
belong to the Native American Church. 59

The argument that such an exemption-exemption ofa religious practice assuch,
exemption of the practice because it is a religiouspractice-necessarily violates the
nonestablishment norm begins with this proposition: the nonestablishment norm
forbids government to take any action privileging a religious practice on the ground
that the practice, because it is religious, is better along one or more dimensions of
value than another, nonreligious practice. An exemption of a religious practice as
such necessarily violates the proposition: to exempt a religious practice as such-to
exempt the practice because it is religious-is to privilege the practice on the ground
that the practice, because it is religious, is better (i.e., more worthy ofthe exemption)
than any nonreligious practice subject to the ban. For example, to exempt the
sacramental use of wine at Mass because the practice is religious is to privilege the
practice based on the ground that because it is religious, the sacramental use of wine
at Mass is more worthy ofthe exemption than, for example, the nonsacramental use
of wine at the evening meal.
The problem with this argument is that it mistakenly assumes that the radical
version of the nonestablishment norm,rather than the moderate version, is part of
our constitutional law. Recall that according to the moderate version of the norm,
government may affirm a certain few very basic religious beliefs (but only
noncoercively): there is a God, who created us and who both loves us and judges us;
and because God created us and loves us, we are all sacred (inviolable). Thus, the
moderate version of the nonestablishment norm, unlike the radical version, permits
government to privilege, by exempting, a religious practice on the ground that
because the practice affirms, whatever else it affirms, that there is a God who created
us andjudges us (and because exempting the practice will not seriously compromise
any important governmental objective), the practice merits an exemption from the
ban. (There is nothing necessarily coercive about such an exemption.') The point
can be articulated in more ecumenical terms: the moderate version of the
nonestablishment norm permits government to privilege, by exempting, a religious

58. The VolsteadActprovided that'Svine for sacramental purposes may be manufactured,
purchased, sold, bartered, transported, imported, exported, delivered, furnished, and
possessed." Ch.1, 41 Stat. 308-09 (1921).
59. See James Brooke, MilitaryEnds Conflict ofCareerandReligion:American Indians
Win Ritual Peyote Use, N.Y. TIMEs, May 7, 1997, at A16.
60. Nonetheless, one or another exemption can be coercive. Imagine, for example, that
government is conscripting persons to serve in the military but that it exempts religious
pacifists from such service. Depending on government's manpower needs, it is possible that
in consequence of exempting one or more religious pacifists, one or more others who would
not be conscripted to serve in the military must now be conscripted. This seems a good reason
for concluding that in some imaginable circumstances, if government wants to exempt
religious pacifists, it must exempt pacifists without regard to whether they are religious or
not. Otherwise government will be coercing some persons to support-with their bodies and
lives-religion as such, rather than coercing some persons to support conscientious objection
whether or not it is religious.
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practice on the ground that because the practice affirms that there is a transcendent
reality that is our alpha and our omega-our ultimate origin and our ultimate
end-the practice merits an exemption. Because the moderate version of the
nonestablishment norm, not the radical version, is part of our constitutional law, it
is not surprising that the Supreme Court rejects-every sitting Justice except Justice
Stevens rejects-the position that government may never exempt religious practice
as such.
This is not to deny the possibility that such an exemption might be grounded on
a religious belief more sectarian than any the moderate version of the
nonestablishment norm permits government to affirm-for example, the belief that
the sacramental use of wine at Mass is theologically sound. But this possibility is not
a reason for disallowing each and every exemption of religious practice as such. It
is instead a reason for insisting that government be careful not to discriminate
against one or more religions in deciding whether to grant such an exemption-so
that, for example, if government exempts, or would exempt, the sacramental use of
wine at Mass, it must also exempt, absent a persuasive explanation for declining to
do so, the sacramental ingestion of peyote in Native American religious ritual. To
exempt the sacramental use of wine, while refusing to exempt the sacramental
ingestion of peyote when to do so would not seriously compromise any important
governmental objective,61 is not plausibly understood as exempting a religious
practice merely on the ground that the practice affirms (whatever else it affirms) that
there is a God who created us and judges us. But to exempt both the sacramental use
ofwine and the sacramental ingestion of peyote is plausibly understood injust those
terms. In any event, the moderate version of the nonestablishment norm, unlike the
radical version, permits government to privilege, by exempting, a religious practice
on the ground that because the practice affirms (whatever else it affirms) that there
is a God who created us and judges us-or, more ecumenically, on the ground that
there is a transcendent reality that is our ultimate origin and our ultimate end-the
practice merits an exemption from the ban.
Nonetheless, I concur in the judgment of Doug Laycock62 and Fred Gedicks63
(among others) that there is simply no good reason for government to distinguish
between, on the one side, acts of conscience that are understood in religious terms
by those who engage in the acts and, on the other, acts of conscience that are
understood in nonreligious terms by those who engage in the acts. There is no
relevant difference-no difference relevant to legitimate public policy
concerns-between acts of conscience self-understood in religious terms and acts of
conscience self-understood in nonreligious terms. Moreover, if we agree that for
purposes of the free exercise and nonestablishment norms, there is no relevant
difference between a theistic religion, like Christianity, and a nontheistic religion,
like some forms of Buddhism, then there is at best a gossamer distinction between
acts of conscience that are self-understood in nontheistic-religious terms and those
that are self-understood in terms of nonreligious but nonetheless bedrock moral

61. See supratext accompanying note 25.
62. See supratext accompanying note 42.
63. See Gedicks, supranote 55, at 574.
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convictions.' There is no certainly no relevant difference-no difference relevant
either to legitimate public policy concerns or to the constitutional protection of free
exercise-between acts of conscience self-understood in nontheistic-religious terms
and such acts self-understood in terms ofnonreligiousbutnonethelessbedrockmoral
convictions.65 Doug Laycock has discussed all this at length in his wonderful essay,
ReligiousLiberty as Liberty.66 Here is Laycock's rigorously defended conclusion:
[Tihe law should protect nontheists' deeply held conscientious objection to
compliance with civil law to the same extent that it protects the theistically
motivated conscientious objection oftraditional believers. UnitedStatesv.Seeger
and Welsh v. United States were rightly decided; they implement policies at the
core of religious liberty. The law cannot protect the pursuit of all personal
commitments or obligations, or all disagreements with the policy or prudence of
political decisions. Unlike religious disagreements, political disagreements are
committed to the political process ....What the law can do is protect those
moral obligations of nontheists that are functionally equivalent to the protected
moral obligations of theists.

64. 1 invite any reader inclined to do so to try to think of a counterexample to this claim.
65. Cf.Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) ("We think this attempt to
distinguish [UnitedStates v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)] fails for the reason that it places
undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs.").
66. See Laycock, supranote 42, at 331-37; see also Gedicks, supra note 55, at 574.
67. Laycock, supranote 42, at 331 (footnotes omitted). Of course, the protection Laycock
recommends-the protection he says that law canprovide-is conditional, not unconditional;
it is presumptive protection, not absolute protection. Thus, it would have made sense for the
courts to have interpreted RFRA in the ecumenical way Laycock's comment suggests-just
as a generation earlier § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act was
interpreted ecumenically. See supra text accompanying note 59. (Laycock was a principal
drafter of RFRA.) Such an interpretation would have gone a long way-perhaps the whole
way-toward meeting a principal objection to RFRA. Professors Eisgruber and Sager have
allowed for "the possibility that a constitutional privilege for religion could be rehabilitated
if it were generalized to include a wider range of human commitments and thus avoid the
complaints of sectarianism or partisanship. The idea would be to privilege all acts of
conscience, not merely those that are rooted in a conventionally religious system of belief."
Eisgruber & Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 30, at 1268.
For a thoughtful argument that constitutional doctrine regarding religious freedom should
be reoriented to "focus ...on the protection of individual conscience" without regard to
whether the conscience is "religious" in any conventional sense-and for a suggestion ofwhat
the reoriented constitutional doctrine might look like-see Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The
Separationofthe Religious and the Secular:A FoundationalChallenge to FirstAmendment
Theory, 36 WL. & MARY L. REv. 837, 961 (1995). See also Laura Underkuffler-Freund,
Yoder and the Question ofEquality, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 789 (1986). Underkuffler's proposal
is hardly utopian. Neither the InternationalCovenanton Civil andPoliticalRights,see supra
note 25, which the United States ratified in 1992, nor the more elaborate Declarationon the
EliminationofAll Forms ofIntoleranceand ofDiscriminationBased on Religion or Belief,
see supranote 8, distinguishes between acts of religious conscience and acts of nonreligious
conscience.

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 75:295

7
The nonestablishment norm has been at the center of several political
controversies in the modem period of American constitutional law-the period
roughly since the end of World War II. (It wasn't until 1947 that the
nonestablishment norm was held to apply to the states.) I want to mention three
such controversies, the most famous of which concerns prayer in public schools.
Although hugely and persistently controversial in some quarters, the Supreme
Court's rulings on this matter are sound.69 Fora state legislature, a city/county school
board, a public school principal, or a public school teacher to make a religious
practice, like Bible reading or saying the Lord's Prayer,'0 part of the school day is for
government to violate the nonestablishment norm, because it is for government to
take action based on the view that the religious practice is better-truer or more
efficacious spiritually, or more authentically American-than one or more other
religious or nonreligious practices or than no religious practice at all. But what if the
religious practice consists only of a prayer to the effect that God created us and loves
us and that we are therefore grateful and give thanks to God? Although the content
of that hypothetical prayer affirms no more than the moderate version of the
nonestablishment norm permits government to affirm, for government to make
saying that prayer part of the school day is to violate the nonestablishment norm,
because, as a practical matter, it is to coerce young students to attend a religious
service in which the beliefs are affirmed. 7 Recall that even according to the

68. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
69. This is not to say that the Court's reasons for its rulings are invariably sound. Rulings
are one thing, reasons another. But the Court's rulings are sound. For the most important of
the Court's rulings, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
70. See Schempp, 374 U.S. 203.
71. Forthe Supreme Court's development ofthe as-a-practical-matter-coercion point see
Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-99. If one's reasons for wanting not to be present at a religious service
are religions reasons, there might be a free exercise problem as well as a nonestablishment
one. But whether or not there is a free exercise problem, there is a (fatal) nonestablishment
problem.
I should note that in Lee v. Weisman, the question was the constitutionality of government
making prayer-prayer that affirmed no more than the moderate version of the
nonestablishment norm permits government to affirmn-not part of the school day, but part of
a public school graduation ceremony. Unlike a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia (joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas) thought that there were relevant
differences between government making such prayer part of the school day and its making
such prayer part of a graduation ceremony-differences that justified the conclusion that
government did not violate the nonestablishment norm by making such prayer part ofa public
school graduation ceremony. In particular, Justice Scalia derided the majority's argument that
for government to make such prayer part of a public school graduation ceremony was for
government to act coercively. See id. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In my judgment, the
majority's argument easily survived Justice Scalia's derision. (For a contrary judgment, see
Ann E. Stockman, Comment, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education: The
BlackSheep of GraduationPrayerCases, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1805, 1831-35 (1999).) Justice
Scalia no doubt smiled on the court's decision in Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir.
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1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997), where the court ruled that for government to make
a "nonsectarian" religious prayer, delivered each year by a member of a different religious
faith, part of a public university graduation ceremony was not for government to act
coercively. The court concluded (sensibly, in my view) that "[u]nlike in [Lee v. Weisman],
here there was no coercion-real or otherwise-to participate [in the prayer]." Id. at 985.
Several cases involving prayer in public high school settings have been decided by the lower
federal courts, with varying results, since the Supreme Court decided Lee v. Weisman. See,
e.g., Chandler v.James, 180 F.3d 1254 (1 th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321,
147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), reh 'g grantedand opinion withdrawn, No. 97-35642, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 5051 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 1999), vacated as moot, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir.
1999) (en banc); Doev. SantaFe Indep. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 1013 (Sth Cir. 1999); ACLU v.
Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996); Jones v. Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993). With
Bush Asks Courtto Reconsider Its
respect to the Santa Fe case, see [Governor George IV.]
RulingAgainstPrayerat[PublicHighSchool] FootballGames,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1999,
at A10.
As I said, the Court's rulings on the matter of prayer in the public schools are sound. But
the Court's ruling in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), upholding the
constitutionality of the chaplaincy at issue there, is extremely problematic: public finds were
used to pay the chaplain. See id. at 784-85.
The Nebraska Legislature begins each of its sessions with a prayer offered by a
chaplain who is chosen biennially by the Executive Board of the Legislative
Council and paid out ofpublic funds. Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister,
has served as chaplain since 1965 at a salary of $319.75 per month for each
month the legislature is in session.
Id. (footnote omitted).
As I explain elsewhere in this Essay, because the nonestablishment norm forbids
government to discriminate in favor ofreligious activities, government may not spend taxes
to aid religious activities as such-as religiousactivities. It is irrelevant that government's
discrimination affirms only one or more of those few very basic religious beliefs that the
moderate version of the nonestablishment norm allows government to affirm, because
governmentmay affin those beliefs onlynoncoerively.In affirming the beliefs-and, inthat
sense and to that extent, in discriminating in favor of religion-government may not coerce
any person to affin the beliefs, nor may it coerce any person to attend a religious service in
which the beliefs are affirmed or otherwise to lend support to the beliefs-for example,
financial support, in the form of tax dollars.
Does it violate the nonestablishment norm-should the Court rule that it violates the
norm-for government to make recital of the Pledge ofAllegiance, which contains the phrase
"under God," part of the school day? In Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980
F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992), the court ruled that government may make voluntary recital of the
joined by Rehnquist,
Pledge part of the school day. But cf.Lee, 505 U.S. at 639 (Scalia, J.,
C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) ("Must the Pledge [of Allegiance] therefore be
barred from the public schools (both from graduation ceremonies and from the classroom)?
...Logically, that ought to be the next project for the Court's bulldozer."). Although a
student is constitutionally free to refuse to recite the Pledge, see West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), she is also constitutionally free to refuse to say the
hypothetical prayer sketched inthe paragraph accompanying this note, and yet for government
to make saying that prayer part of the school day is nonetheless rightly understood to be
practically coercive of young students.
One may plausibly conclude that whatever religious dimension routine public recital ofthe
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moderate version ofthe nonestablishment norm, government may not coerce anyone
to affirm any religious beliefs whatsoever or to attend a religious service in which
any religious beliefs are affirmed or otherwise to lend support to any religious
beliefs.
A second prominent nonestablishment controversy concerns government display
of religious symbols or texts.72 A municipality's display of a creche in city hall at
Christmastime is one example,' a judge's display of the Decalogue (the Ten
Commandments) in his courtroom, another. 4 Such a display does not necessarily
discriminate in favor of one or more religious; that is, such a display is not
necessarily based on the view that the religion or religious whose symbol or text is
displayed, or the religious message represented by the displayed symbol or text, is
better (truer or more efficacious spiritually, or more authentically American) than
one or more other religious or religious messages or than no religion or religious
message at all. (Perhaps the Decalogue is merely one of several classic legal codes,
secular as well as religious, on display.) But if in fact based on that view,
government display ofa religious symbol ortextviolates the nonestablishment norm.
(Such display violates the norm, that is, unless what the symbol symbolizes or what
the text affirms falls within the small zone of religious beliefs excepted by the
moderate version ofthe nonestablishment norm. Neither a creche nor the Decalogue
is such a symbol or text.) One can hypothesize situations in which government
display of a religious symbol or text undeniably discriminates in favor of one or more
religions or religious messages. Imagine, for example, crucifixes, but no other
religious symbols, hung in the classrooms of a public elementary school. In the real
world, however, government display of a religious symbol or text may well be

Pledge retains is so slight, so marginal, as to be legally de minimis-thatnotwithstanding the
phrase "under God," routine public recital of the Pledge is so much less a religious exercise
than a quintessentially civic one: a collective public expression of "allegiance" (loyalty,
fidelity) to "the republic for which [the flag] stands." Indeed, Justice Brennan once went so
far as to suggest that routine public recital ofthe Pledge no longer retained "any true religious
significance." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 818. In his dissenting opinion in Marsh v. Chambers,
Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) wrote, "I frankly do not know what should be
the proper disposition of features of our public life such as 'God save the United States and
this Honorable Court,' 'In God We Trust,' 'One Nation, Under God,' and the like. I might
well adhere to the view.., that such mottos are consistent with the Establishment Clause
...because they have lost any true religious significance." Id. Moreover, a student, like
others participating in a routine public recital of the Pledge, can seamlessly and without
fanfare or evennotice-and, therefore, without obloquy-omitthe "under God" from her own
recital of the Pledge. So it's far from clear that the Court would achieve anything of real
consequence in spending its capital on a ruling that government may not make recital of the
Pledge part of the school day-or that it may make recital only of an excised Pledge, the
Pledge sans "under God," part of the school day.
72. As distinct from government permitting a private party to display a religious symbol
on public property. See infra note 74.
73. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
74. See Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Abuse ofJudicialPower, 39 J. CHURCH &
STATE 203 (1997); Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST.
COMMENTARY 471 (1998). Cf.Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (holding
that display of Ten Commandments in public school violates nonestablishment norm).
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ambiguous; as recent Supreme Court cases illustrate, there may well be room for a
reasonable difference in judgment about whether the display discriminates in favor
of, about whether it affirms or endorses, one or more religions or religious
messages. 75
A third nonestablislunent controversy that merits mention here concerns
government endorsement ofareligious-fundamentalist account ofthe material origin
of life, including human life. The notorious Scopes trial,76 famously dramatized in
the play Inherit the Wind,' is a memorable episode in this controversy-a
controversy that persists to this day. 8 An Arkansas statute, enacted in 1928, made
"it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university 'to teach the
theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of
animals,' or 'to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches' this
theory." 9 Did the statute violate the nonestablishment norm? According to the
nonestablishment norm, government may not take action based on the view that that
one or more religious tenets are closer to the truth or otherwise better than one or
more competing religious or nonreligious tenets. (The few basic religious beliefs
excepted by the the moderate version of the nonestablishment norm do not include
Christian-fundamentalist beliefs about the material origin of human life.) The
Arkansas statute violated the nonestablishment norm, therefore, if it was based on
the view that a particular religious tenet, about the material origin of the human
species, is truer or otherwise better than the scientific theory whose teaching the
statute makes unlawful. (Here "better" means something like "more reflective of, and
therefore less subversive of, the dominant religious beliefs of the community.") But
was the Arkansas statute based on such a tenet? The Supreme Court, in Eppersonv.
Arkansas, appears to have believed that the law was indeed so based. Emphasizing

75. See Allegheny County, 492 S.s.573; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See
also Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004
(1998).

My focus here has been on government display of a religious symbol (or text). A related
issue concerns government permitting a private party to display a religious symbol on public
property. The Supreme Court recently listed three "factors that we consider determinative

... [:] the State did not sponsor respondents' expression, the expression was made on
government property that had been opened for speech, and permission was requested through
the same application process and on the same terms required of other private groups." Capitol
Square Review &Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995). The Court's approach
seems right If(and only if) the Court's three criteria are satisfied, the inference is sound that
government's grant of permission was not based on the view that one or more religions (or
religious practices or tenets) are better than one or more other religions or than no religion
at all. Cf. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
76. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
77. JEROME LAwRENCE & ROBERT E. LEE, IhERI TBE WiND (1955). A film version of
the play, directed by Stanley Kramer, was released in 1960; the screenplay was written by
Nathan E. Douglas and Harold Jacob Smith.
78. See, e.g., Jon Christensen, Teachers Fightfor Darwin'sPlace in U.S. Classrooms,
N.Y. TvMEs, Nov. 24, 1998, at F3.
79. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,98-99 (1968) (quoting Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1627
(1960 Repl. Vol.)).
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that the statute "was a product of the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor of
the twenties,"8 the Court reasoned:
[T]here can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from
discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief ofsome that
the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of
man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by
considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its
citizens. It is clear that findamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's
reason for existence.8"
But can't one imagine a nonreligious basis for a law like Arkansas's? Consider
this: "Teaching the theory of evolution is simply too controversial in this community
at this time, so let's not do it; let's keep the subject out of the classroom." Compare
this imagined rationale with this different position: "As an explanation of the
material origin of human life, the account in Genesis (interpreted literally) is right
and the scientific theory of evolution is wrong." In Epperson, the Court seems to
have concluded that but for the latter, religious rationale, the Arkansas law would
not have been enacted-and, therefore, that the law violated the nonestablishment
2
norm.8

80. Id. at 98.
81. Id. at 107-08.
82. Did the record in Epperson warrant the Court's conclusion? Whatever the answer,
Justice Scalia doubted-reasonably doubted, in my view--that the undeveloped record in a
later, related case warranted the Court's conclusion in the case. A Louisiana statute, of more
recent vintage than the 1928 Arkansas law, prohibited
the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by
instruction in "creation science." No school is required to teach evolution or
creation science. If either is taught, however, the other must also be taught. The
theories of evolution and creation science are statutorily defined as "the
scientific evidences for [creation and evolution] and inferences from those
scientific evidences."
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987) (quoting LA. REV. STAT.ANN. §§ 17.286.4A
and 17.286.3(2) and (3) (West 1982)). Did this statute violate the nonstablishment norm? It
did if, as a majority of the Court concluded inAguillard,it was based on sectarian religious
belief. But was the statute based on such belief? Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist) insisted in dissent that there was a serious question whether the Louisiana statute
was in fact based on such beliefrather than on the view that two competing scientific theories
of creation should be taught "so that students would not be 'indoctrinated' but would instead
be free to decide for themselves, based upon a fair presentation of the scientific evidence,
about the origin of life." Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). In
Justice Scalia's viewi the majority acted prematurely-and therefore peremptorily-in
answering the question:
Perhaps what the Louisiana Legislature has done is unconstitutional because
there is no [scientific] evidence [in support of "creation science"], and the
scheme they have established will amount to no more than a presentation of the
Book of Genesis. But we cannot say that on the evidence before us in the
summaryjudgment context, which includes ample uncontradicted testimony that
"creation science" is a body of scientific knowledge rather than revealed belief.
Infinitely less can we say (or should we say) that the scientific evidence for
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Perhaps the most consequential nonestablishment controversy now engaging the
courts, state as well as federal, concerns government financial aid, both direct and
indirect, to religiously affiliated organizations, especially religiously affiliated
primary and secondary schools.'
Assume that a state legislature, with the enthusiastic support ofthe governor, has
decided to provide a financial subsidy to financially ailing private, not-for-profit
primary and secondary schools in the state,' which, in the judgment of the
legislature and governor, are making an invaluable contribution to the education of
children. Assume further that although some ofthe schools that would be eligible to
receive the subsidy are not religiously affiliated, most are. Does the nonestablishment
norm require government to exclude religiously affiliated schools from the subsidy
program because they are religiously affiliated? Or does the norm permit government
to include schools in the program without regard to whether they are religiously
affiliated or not?
A kindred hypothetical: Assume that the legislature and governor have opted to
take a somewhat different path; because they want to bring within the reach of more
parents of limited financial means the possibility of sending their child(ren) to a

evolution is so conclusive that no one could be gullible enough to believe that
there is any real scientific evidence to the contrary, so that the legislature's
stated purpose must be a lie. Yet that illiberal judgment, that Scopes-in-reverse,
is ultimately the basis on which the Court's facile rejection of the Louisiana
Legislature's purpose must rest
Id. at 634 (emphasis in original).
83. After drafting this Part of this Essay, I received and read an article that defends
substantially the same position I defend here-but, happily, does so much more fully than I
do here. See Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETmIcs & PuB. POL'Y 341, 342-47. (1999). Volokh's discussion of competing arguments is
especially useful.
Supreme Court majorities have been fairly relaxed about government aid to religiously
affiliated colleges and universities. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976). By contrast, Court majorities have been quite agitated about government aid to
religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools. The Court's opinions with respect to
government aid of the latter sort are not merely agitated but, as a whole, chaotic. There is a
virtual consensus among commentators that the Supreme Court's decisions about government
aid to religiously affiliated schools-in particular, its decisions about aid to religiously
affiliated primary and secondary schools-are an unholy mess. It is difficult to discern a
nonarbitrary distinction betweenthe situations in which the Court has invalidated government
aid to religiously affiliated primary or secondary schools and the situations in which it has
declined to do so. See, e.g., JESSEH. CHoPER, SECURINGREuGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR
JUDICIALNTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 174-76 (1995). This is not to deny that

some Supreme Courtjustices have staked out a reasonably consistent position in the cases in
question. Nonetheless, the position ofthe Court as awhole rests on no nonarbitrary distinction
between the contexts in which the Court has struck down government aid to religiously
affiliated primary or secondary schools and the contexts in which it has let such aid stand.
84. Subject to certain appropriate limitations-for example, no subsidy may go to a school
that discriminates on the basis of race or sex.
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private, not-for-profit primary or secondary school, they have decided to establish a
voucher program under which parents who meet the eligibility criteria would receive
an annual check to help them defray a portion of the expense of sending their child
to such a school.85 Does the nonestablishment norm require government to exclude
religiously affiliated schools from the program? Or does the norm permit
government to include schools in the program without regard to whether they are
religiously affiliated or not?
A final hypothetical: Assume that the legislature and governor have concluded that
because many private, charitable organizations in the state that are serving the poor
or the unemployed and underemployed are doing such an effective, and costeffective, job, the state should bolster the efforts of such organizations by making
some public funds available to them.86 Does the nonestablishment norm require
government to exclude religiously affiliated ("faith-based") organizations from the
program? Or does the norm permit government to include organizations in the
program without regard to whether they are religiously affiliated or not?
In none of the three hypotheticals is it necessarily the case-indeed, in none does
it seem even likely the case-that the proposed government aid program is based on
the view that one or more religions (or religious tenets or practices) are truer or
otherwise better than one or more other religions or than no religion at all. If a
government aid program is not based on such a view, the program does not violate
the nonestablishment norm. As a recent third-party presidential candidate was wont
to say, it's just that simple.87 Correctly understood, the nonestablishment norm does
not forbid government to provide financial aid to religiously affiliated organizations,
including religiously affiliated schools, so long as two criteria are met: First, the aid
is provided on a religiously neutral basis; that is, the aid is provided to eligible
recipients without regard to whether they are religiously affiliated or not. Second, the
aid program is not a subterfuge for discriminating in favor of one or more religions
in relation to one or more other religions or to no religion.
At long last, the Supreme Court, followed by some state courts-indeed, led by a
few state courts-is coming around, though hesitantly, to the position articulated in
the preceding paragraph.88 This is an important story, but there is no need to

85. Again, subject to certain appropriate limitations-for example, no voucher may be
used in connect ion with a school that discriminates on the basis of race or sex.
86. Subject to certain appropriate limitations.
87. This is not to deny that the issue merits more elaborate discussion than I can provide
here-discussion attentive to the arguments mounted by constitutional scholars on the other
side of the issue. For a recent discussion, see Symposium on Law and Religion, 13 NoTRE
DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PuB. POL'Y 239 (1999); Commentary on School Vouchers and the

EstablishmentClause, 31 CONN. L. REv. 803 (1999).
88. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector &Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see also Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998)
(holding, in part, that Milwaukee voucher program, which includes religiously affiliated
schools, does not violate federal nonestablishment norm), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998);
Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (holding, in part, that state law allowing a
state tax credit of up to $500 for those who donate to "school tuition organizations," including
religiously affiliated school tuition organizations, does not violate federal nonestablishment
norm).
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rehearse it here: The story has recently been well told elsewhere.' One aspect ofthe
story merits briefmention, however: the virulent anti-Catholicism that animated not
only Protestant opposition to Catholic schools but also judicial opposition (in the
name of the nonestablishment norm) to government aid to such schools even when
the aid program was religiously neutral. The anti-Catholic bigotry is now largely
spent, but one legacy of the bigotry lingers: the position, still defended by some
Supreme Court justices" and some scholars91 and others,' that a program of
government aid to religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools can violate
the nonestablishment norm even if the criteria for the aid are religiously neutral and
the program is not a subterfuge for discriminating in favor of the schools. That
position took root in the soil of anti-Catholic bigotry, as Doug Laycock has recently
explained.93 (Laycock is not a Catholic or even a religious believer.94) As Laycock
notes, near the end of his discussion:
Respectable anti-Catholicism faded in the 1950s and all but collapsed in the
1960s in the wake of the Kennedy presidency and Vatican I[. But even at the
time of Lemon [v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)], some justices were
influenced by residual anti-Catholicism and by a deep suspicion of Catholic
schools. This appears most clearly in Justice Douglas's citation of an antiCatholic hate tract in his concurring opinion in Lemon, and in Justice Black's
dissenting opinion in Board ofEducationv. Allen[, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968)].
The Court's opinion in Lemon is more subtle and arguably open to more
charitable interpretations, but it relied on what it considered to be inherent risks
in religious schools despite the absence of a record in Lemon itself and despite
contrary fact-finding by the district court in the companion case. 91
To hold that government may not give financial aid to religiously affiliated schools
or other religiously affiliated organizations even if the criteriafor the aid are
religiously neutral and the aidprogram is not a subterfugefor affirming one or

89. See Carl H. Esbeck, A ConstitutionalCasefor Government Cooperationwith FaithBasedSocialService Providers,46 EMoRY L.J. 1(1997); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying
Unity ofSeparationand Neutrality,46 EMoRY L.J. 43 (1997).
90. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 240-47 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg & in part
by Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
91. For example, see Sullivan, infra note 98. See also Recent Cases, Establishment
Clause-School Vouchers-Wisconsin Supreme CourtUpholdsMilwaukee ParentalChoice

Program,112 HI-Iv. L. REv. 737 (1999) (criticizing Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in
Jackson).
92. For example, the editorial board of the N.Y. TIMEs. See Editorial, Breachingthe
Church-State Wall, N.Y. TbMEs, June 12, 1998, at A20 (criticizing Wisconsin Supreme
Court's decision inJacksonv. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), which held, inpart, that
Milwaukee voucher program, which includes religiously affiliated schools, does not violate
federal nonestablishmentnorm); Editorial, VouchersforParochialSchools,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
11, 1998, atA26 (criticizing U.S. Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Jackson v. Benson,
sub nom. Gilbert v. Moore, 119 S. Ct. 467 (1998)). For commentary that is, in my judgment,
much sounder, see Eugene Volokh, Vouched For: School Choice Is Constitutional,NEw

REPUBUc, July 6, 1998, at 12 (defending Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision).
93. See Laycock, supra note 89, at 50-51.
94. See Laycock, supra note 42, at 352-56.

95. Laycock, supranote 89, at 58 (footnotes omitted).
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more religionsas such would be to hold that government must discriminate against
religious activities. That government may not discriminate in favor of religious
activities does not entail that government must discriminate againstthem. I cannot
imagine why, as a matter of political morality, one should want to require
government to discriminate against religious activities-or, therefore, why one
should want to construe the nonestablishment norm to require such discrimination.
The fact that some persons object to their taxes being spent in aid of religious
activities no more justifies such discrimination-it no more justifies according
constitutional status to their objection, however conscientious their objection might
be-than the fact that some persons object to their taxes being spent in aid of
military activities, for example, or capital punishment, or abortion (etc.), justifies
according constitutional status to theirobjection.96
Of course, because the nonestablishment norm forbids government to discriminate
in favor of religious activities, government may not spend taxes to aid religious
activities as such-as religiousactivities. But what if government's discrimination
canbe understood to affirm only one or more of those few very basic religious beliefs
that the moderate version of the nonestablishment norm allows government to
affirm? No matter, because government may affirm those beliefs only noncoercively.
In affirming the beliefs-and, in that sense and to that extent, in discriminating in
favor of religion-government may not coerce any person to affirm the beliefs, nor
may it coerce any person to attend a religious service in which the beliefs are
affirmed or otherwise to lend support to the beliefs-for example, financial support,
in the form oftax dollars." So, one is constitutionally entitled to have one's taxes not
spent in aid of religious activities as such; one's objection to having one's taxes
spent to support religious activities-religious activities as such-does have
constitutional status.
But none of this means that government must, or even should, discriminate against
religious activities; none of this entails that government must, or should, disfavor
religious activities as such. That it is wrong for government to discriminate infavor
ofan activity does not mean that it is right for government to discriminate against
the activity-any more than that it is wrong for government to discriminate against
an activity means that it is right for government to discriminate in favor of the
activity. One is not constitutionally entitled to have one's taxes not spent in aid of
religious activities if excluding religious activities from the spending program

96. See Esbeck, supra note 89, at 18.
As citizens we are taxed to support all manner of policies and programs with
which we disagree. Tax dollars pay for weapons of mass destruction that some
believe are evil. Taxes pay for abortions and the execution of capital offenders,
that some believe are acts of murder. Taxes pay the salaries of public officials
whose policies we despise and oppose at every opportunity. Why is religion
different?
Id.
Esbeck continues: "If the answer is that we are protecting a religiously informed
conscientious right not to have one's taxes go toward the support of religion, the Supreme
Court has already rejected such a claim." Id. (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689
(1971)).
97. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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discriminates against the activities, if it disfavors the activities as religions
activities.9" Given the great extent to which the citizenry of the United States is
religious," it seems perverse to suggest that the nonestablishment norm should be
construed not only to forbid government to discriminate in favor of religious
activities, but also to require government to discriminate against such activities.
The serious question, in my judgment, is not whether the nonestablishment norm
requires government to discriminate against religious activities. The serious question
is whether the free exercise norm permits government to discriminate against
religious activities."° Recall: Government may not discriminate against a religious
activity-that is, it may not discriminate against a religious activity as such, as a
religious activity-by denying to persons, because they engage in the activity, a
benefit it would otherwise confer on them. It simply would make no sense, it would
be naive and even foolish, to forbid government to ban "the casting of 'statues that
are to be used for worship purposes"' while leaving government free to deny to
persons, because they cast such statues, a benefit it would otherwise give to them."'

98. Thus, I disagree with those, like Kathleen Sullivan and the Baptist Joint Committee
on Public Affairs, who argue that an objection to one's taxes being spent in aid of religious
activities has constitutional status. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CmH. L. REV. 195, 208-14 (1992); Brief of Baptist Joint Committee on
Public Affairs, National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, American Jewish
Congress, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Hadassah, the Women's Zionist
Organization of America, Inc., People for the American Way, and National Coalition for
Public Education and Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiaein Support of the Respondents,
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Is there persuasive
historical support for the claim that one's objection to one's taxes being spent in aid of
religious activities has constitutional status?Iam skeptical. SeeRosenberger,515 U.S. at 85657 (Thomas, J., concurring)
[Tihe history cited by the dissent cannot support the conclusion that the
Establishment Clause 'categorically condemn[s] state programs directly aiding
religious activity' when that aid is part of a neutral program available to a wide
array of beneficiaries. Even if Madison believed that the principle of
nonestablishment of religion precluded governmental financial support for
religion per se (in the sense of government benefits specifically targeting
religion), there is no indication that at the time of the framing he took the
dissent's extreme view that the government must discriminate against religious
adherents by excluding them from more generally available financial subsidies
.... The dissent identifies no evidence that the Framers intended to disable
religious entities from participating onneutral terms in even-handed government
programs. The evidence that does exist points in the opposite direction ....
Id.
99. According to recentpolling data, "[a]n overwhelming 95% ofAmericans profess belief
in God." Richard N. Ostling, In So Many Gods We Trust, TME, Jan. 30, 1995, at 72.
Moreover, "70% of American adults [are] members of a church or synagogue." Book Note,
Religion and Roe: The Politics of Exclusion, 108 HARV. L. REy. 495, 498 n.21 (1994)
(reviewing EuzABETm MENsCI & ALAN FREEMAN, THE PoLrrcs OF VIRTUE: Is ABORTION
DEBATABLE? (1993)). Cf Andrew Greeley, The PersistenceofReligion, CRoss CuRRENTs,
Spring 1995, at 24.
100. See Volokh, supranote 92, at 14.
101. See supranote 17.
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Therefore, for government to deny a benefit to schools or charitable organizations
that they would receive but for the fact that they are religiously affiliated is for
government to discriminate against religious activities in violation of the free
exercise norm. (A religiously affiliated school and a religiously affiliated charitable
organization is each a species of religious activity.) Similarly, if government were
to deny a voucher to parents that they would receive but for the fact that the private
school to which they chose to send their child is religiously affiliated, government
would discriminate against religious activity in violation ofthe free exercise norm."m
As the Supreme Court acknowledged over a half century ago, in Everson v. Board
ofEducation, the free exercise and nonestablishment norms together require "the
state to be neutral in its relationship with groups of religious believers and
nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used to handicap religions than it is to favor them."' 3 Indeed, the Court
insisted, in Everson, that the free exercise norm prevents a state from "exclud[ing]
individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because oftheirfaith, or
lack ofit, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."" °4

9
I have sketched, in this Essay, some of what the nonestablishment norm forbids
government to do. I have also sketched some of what the norm does not forbid
government to do-or, at least, some of what, in my judgment, it should not be
understood to forbid government to do. I now want to turn to this inquiry: givenboth
what the nonestablishment norm forbids government to do and also what it does not
forbid government to do, should we Americans want the nonestablishment norm to
be part of our constitutional law? Should we want the nonestablishment norm not to
be part of our constitutional law? Should it be largely a matter of indifference
whether the norm is part of our constitutional law? As I noted earlier in this Essay,
that we Americans should want the free exercise norm (i.e., qua antidiscrimination

102. But see Strout v. Commissioner, 13 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Me. 1998).
103. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
104. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). "[W]e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New
Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure thatwe do not inadvertently prohibitNew
Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their
religious belief." 1d.
Contrary to intimations by the dissenting justices inEverson,the New Jersey law at issue
in Everson did not single out Catholic schools. The law singled out private, not-for-profit
schools. "Whenever in any district there are children living remote from any schoolhouse, the
board of education of the district may make rules and contracts for the transportation of such
children to and from school, including the transportation of school children to and from school
other than a public school, except such school as is operated for profit in whole or in part."
Chapter 191, [New Jersey] Laws of 1941, Approved June 9, 1941. Moreover, the record in
Everson did not warrant the conclusion that the law's singling out private, not-for-profit
schools was, in context, a subterfuge for discriminating in favor of Catholic schools and
against whatever other religiously affiliated or secular private, not-for-profit schools then
existed or might later exist.
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norm) to be part of our constitutional law is not controversial. It is widely agreed that
it is a good thing that the free exercise norm is part of our constitutional law. (Again,
the principal general reason why it is a good thing is based on our historical
experience.) Now we come to this question: should we Americans also want the
nonestablishment norm-for example, the moderate version of the norm-to be part
of our constitutional law? Is it a good thing that the constitutional law of the United
States includes not just the free exercise norm but the nonestablishment norm as
well? Note, with respect to this question, that although the international law of
human rights includes provisions that function just like the free exercise norm-in
particular, forbidding government to discriminate against religious practice-the
international law of human rights does not include anything like a nonestablishment
norm. ' Nor does government action that would violate the nonestablishment norm
necessarily violate any human right.
Consider, for example, the Constitution oflreland, which, in the Preamble, affirms
a nonsectarian Christianity:
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to
Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,
We, the people of tire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ,
Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.'"
Given the religions commitments of the vast majority of the people of Ireland, it is
not at all surprising that the Irish Constitution affirms Christianity. In so doing, the
Irish Constitution violates no human right. Three things are significant here. First,
the religious convictions implicit in the Irish Constitution's affirmation of
Christianity in no way deny-indeed, they affirm-the idea that every human being,
Christianor not, is sacred; they affirm, that is, the very foundation of the idea of
human rights.' Second, the Irish Constitution's affirmation of Christianity is not

105. TheDeclarationon the EliminationofAl FormsofIntoleranceandofDiscrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, supra note 8, which is the principal international document
concerning religious freedom, contains nothing like a nonestablishment requirement
106. IR.CONST. preamble. Moreover, Constitution of Ireland Article 6 states, in relevant
part: "All powers of government, legislative, executive andjudicial, derive, underGod, from
the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in the final appeal, to
decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good."
Id. art. 6, § I (emphasis added). And Article 44 states, in relevant part "The State
acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His
Name in reverence, and shall respect and honor religion." Id. art. 44, § 1. Article 40 states
that "[t]he publication or utterance ofblasphemous, seditious, orindecentmatter is an offence
which shall be punishable in accordance with law." Id. art. 40, § 6, 1*, ii (emphasis added).
On "Religion in the Preamble," see J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CoNs'TrurIoN 6-7 (Gerald Hogan
& Gerry Whyte eds., 3rd ed. 1994).
Although it affirms Christianity, the Irish Constitution explicitly disallows the "endowing"
of any religion. Article 44.2.2 states: "The State guarantees not to endow any religion." IR.
CONST. art. 44, § 2, cl. 2.

107. The idea of human rights is that each and every human being is sacred, and that
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meant to insult or demean anyone; it is meant only to express the most fundamental
convictions of the vast majority of the people of Ireland." 8 Third, and most
importantly, the Irish Constitution protects the right, which is a human right, to
freedom of religion; moreover, it protects this right not just for Christians, who are
the vast majority in Ireland, but for all citizens. Article 44 states, in relevant part:
"Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are...
guaranteed to every citizen... The State shall not impose any disabilities or make
any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status."'"
Therefore, the conclusion that in affirming Christianity the Irish Constitution
violates a human right-or that in consequence of the affirmation Ireland falls short
ofbeing a fll fledged liberal democracy-is, ina word, extreme."' Something Brian

therefore there are certain things that ought not to be done to any human being and certain
other things that ought to be done for every human being. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FouR INQUmmS (1998).

108. In correspondence, Gerry Whyte of the Trinity College (Dublin) Faculty ofLaw (and
co-author of J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONsTrrnON, supra note 106) has called my attention

to
the sectarian nature, in the context of the Christian tradition, of the Preamble.
Which Christian denomination was sustained by Jesus Christ "through centuries
of trial" in Irish history? And what does that imply about Christ's attitude to that
denomination which was responsible for such oppression? Criticism of the
Preamble is not so much-that it endorses Christianity above other world religions
but rather that it is sectarian within the Christian tradition.
Letter from Gerry Whyte to Michael J. Perry, July 12, 1994 (quoted with permission).
Nonetheless, the existence in the Irish Constitution of the clause to which Professor Whyte
refers---"who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial"--seems quite unremarkable,
given the extreme brutality, including religious oppression, endured by the Irish people during
the several centuries in which they were a colonized people. In any event, it is difficult to see
how the existence of the clause in the Irish Constitution violates anyone's human rights.
Incidentally, anyone who thinks that the Catholic Church calls the shots in Ireland knows little
about contemporary Ireland. See Cohn T6ibin, Dublin'sEpiphany,NEW YORKER, Apr. 3,
1995, at 45.
109. IR.CONST. art. 44. Article 44 also states that "[1]egislation providing State aid for
schools shall not discriminate between schools under the management of different religious
denominations, norbe such as to effectprejudicially the rightofany child to attenda school
receivingpublic money withoutattendingreligiousinstructionat thatschool."Id.(emphasis
added).

110. There is a problem with the Irish situation, however. The presidential oath required
by Article 12 of the Irish Constitution reads as follows:
Inthe presence ofAlmighty GodI do solemnly and sincerelypromise and declare
that I will maintain the Constitution of Ireland and uphold its laws, that I will
fulfill my duties faithfully and conscientiously in accordance with the
Constitution and law, and that I will dedicate my abilities to the service and
welfare of the people of Ireland. May God direct and sustain me.
Id. art. 12.
The authors of J.M. KELLY THE IRISH CONSTITUTION inform us that "the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations recently indicated that the religious flavour of the
Presidential oath violated Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion." KELLY, supra note 106, at 85.
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Barry said in his book, Justiceas Impartiality,is relevant here:
We must, ofcourse, keep a sense ofproportion. The advantages of establishment
enjoyed by the Church of England or by the Lutheran Church in SWeden are
scarcely on a scale to lead anyone to feel seriously discriminated against In
contrast, denying the vote to Roman Catholics or requiring subscription to the
Church of England as a condition of entry to Oxford or Cambridge did constitute
a serious source of grievance. Strict adherence to justice as impartiality would,
no doubt, be incompatible with the existence of an established church at all. But
departures from it are venial so long as nobody is put at a significant
disadvantage, either by having barriers put in the way of worshipping according
to the tenets ofhis faith or by having his rights and opportunities in other matters
(politics, education, occupation, for example) materially limited on the basis of
his religious beliefs."'
The question arises, therefore, whether, even though it is certainly a good thing-a
very good thing-that the constitutional law of the United States includes the free
exercise norm, it is also a good thing that it includes a nonestablishment norm that
opposes even a weak, Irish-style establishment. (If there is a satisfactory answer to
this question, afortiorithere is a satisfactory answer to the question whether it is
good that our constitutional law opposes a stronger than Irish-style establishment of
religion.) What need is there for government in the United States to be free to do at
least what Ireland has done? What of value is lost, if anything, by forbidding
government to do even what Ireland has done?"'
As many religious believers understand, politics is generally an incompetent
domain for the discernment of theological truth."3 Moreover, in a society that, like

Presumably the same problem attends the judicial oath required by Article 34, which has the
very same "religious flavour." The judicial oath begins with "In the presence of Almighty
God" and ends with "May God direct and sustain me." IRL CONST. art 34.
111. BRLANBARRY, JusTicE AS IMPARTIALniy 165 n.c (1995).
112. Commenting on the nonestablishment norm, Doug Laycock has said something in
which I concur.
[l]f I had to give up one of the rights in the First Amendment, this is the one I
would give up. A rule against government persuasion or influence is less critical
than a rule against government coercion. In terms of history, in terms of
comparative law and, in terms of what the rest of the world does, the
Establishment Clause is an extraordinaryprotection. We would probably still be
a free society without it. But I at least would mourn the loss. Repeal of our
protection against religious persuasion by government would be a serious
loss ....
Laycock, supranote 36, at 379. For a helpful comparative perspective, suggesting what some
of the losses might be were we Americans to abandon the nonestablishment norm, see
Richard S. Kay, The CanadianConstitutionand the DangersofEstablishment,42 DEPAUL
L. REv. 361 (1992).
113. See Derek H. Davis, Assessing the ProposedReligious EqualityAmendment, 37 J.
CHURCH & STATE 493, 508 (1995):
[A] governmental policy of remaining neutral in regard to religion [is not] a
denial of religious truth; it is only a comnmitment to steer clear of a dimension of
life about which government has little competence, leaving the pursuit of
religious truthto every individual. We would do well to heed the words of James
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ours and unlike Ireland's, is so religiously pluralistic-and increasingly
so-government would alienate many citizens and thereby fray, ifnot tear, the bonds
of political community by attempting even a weak (Irish-style) establishment
Finally, from a practical standpoint, it is utterly unnecessary for us to incur the costs
referred to in the preceding sentence by letting the politically powerful attempt even
a weak establishment of religion. Doug Laycock has put the point well:
In the case of religion, no one has to rule. There is no need for the government
to make decisions about Christian rituals versus Jewish rituals versus no
religious rituals at all. For government to make that choice is simply a gratuitous
statement about the kind ofpeople we really are. By making such statements, the
government says the real American religion is watered-down Christianity, and
everybody else is a little bit un-American.'14
The point that there is no need for government to discriminate in favor of religion
applies, of course, to more than just religious rituals.
The nonestablishment norm is sometimes mistakenly thought to be at least a
faintly anti-religious constitutional ideal. It therefore bears emphasis, at this point,
that one important way to protect freedom of religion is to protect, as the
nonestablishment norm does, freedom from governmentally endorsed
religion-which is, of course, a freedom of religious believers no less than of
religious nonbelievers. An important way to protect the freedom of those of us who
count ourselves religious to follow our religious consciences where they
lead-especially the freedom of those of us who are not politically powerful-is for
the constitutional law of the United States to forbid the politically powerful among
us to act, in large ways or small, in obvious ways or subtle, to privilege ("establish")
their brand of religion. Thus, the nonestablishment norm is good news not just for
the atheists and agnostics among us; it is good news for us all. It is noteworthy, too,
that the nonestablishment norm protects not only freedom of religion, but religion
itself One way for government to corrupt religion-to co-opt it, to drain it of its
prophetic potential-is to seduce religion to get in bed with government; an
important way to protect religion, therefore, is to forbid such intimacy." 5

Madison: "The religion of every man must be left to the conviction and
confidence of every man. In matters of religion no man's right is to be abridged
by the institution of civil society, religion is wholly exempt from its
competence." These words... embody the true meaning of"religious equality."
114. Laycock, supra note 36, at 380. See also Laycock, supra note 42, at 317-18.
115. See Davis, supra note 113, at 507-08. As Davis states:
In this framework religion becomes a tool, a means to control behavior, an
instrument to revivify the people, a cheap hireling to provide a basis for unity,
a means merely to achieve political ends. In the end, religion is the loser. True
religion, genuine faith, is defamed, desecrated, and trivialized. This is the lesson
of history, yet we are on the verge of repeating the same error. Religious belief
has its public dimensions, to be sure, but it is first and foremost a matter of
private right. Church-state separation is the great protector of true faith, not its
inhibitor.
Id.; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 & n.16 (1983) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting).
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So, we Americans should want the nonestablishment norm to be part of our
constitutional law." 6 It is a good thing that our constitutional law includes not just
the free exercise norm, but also the nonestablishment norm-for example, the
moderate version of the nonestablishment norm." Moreover, it is not a bad thing,
or such a bad thing, that, as I noted earlier, our constitutional law does not include
the radical version of the nonestablishment norm. (That is, it is not (such) a bad
thing that, as I noted earlier, no generation of"We the People" ever established and
our constitutional bedrock does not include the radical version of the
nonestablishment norm.) More precisely, it is not (such) a bad thing that in the
United States, government is free to affirm-but only noncoercively-the belief that
there is a God, who created us and who both loves us and judges us, and the belief
that because God created us and loves us, we are all sacred (inviolable). The
"establishment" of religion permitted by the moderate version of the
nonestablishment norm-which establishment is much weaker than, for example,

Even a best case scenario for the fruits of government attempting a weak establishment is
depressing. See Laycock, supranote 36, at 380-81.
Government by its sheer size and prominence will have a disproportionate
influence on the kinds of rituals that are exercised and on public perception of
what are appropriate rituals. The result will not be pretty. Governmentsponsored religion is theologically and liturgically thin. It is politically
compliant It is supportive of incumbent administrations. In intolerant
communities, it inevitably tends to impose the majority's forms, rituals, and
terminology on everybody. In tolerant communities, efforts to be all-inclusive
inevitably lead to desacralization, to the least common denominator, to a secular
incarnation with plastic reindeer, to Christmas and Chanukah mushed together
as the Winter Holidays. By stripping all the specific elements of different faiths
and denominations and attempting to keep only the common elements that all
faiths share, tolerant governments produce a mishmash that no faith can accept
or believe in. It has always been a great puzzle to me why certain elements of the
religious community invest so much effort in demanding that government model
bad religion in this way. There are serious costs to these government religious
observances.
Id.
116. Should government be free to discriminate, ifnot in favor of one or more religions in
relation to one or more other religions, at least in favor of religion generally? There is no such
thing as "religion generally." There are generic prescription drugs, but there is no "generic"
religion. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616-18 (1992) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens &
O'Connor, JJ., concurring); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 819-21 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). There is no such thing, therefore, as "discrimination in
favor of religion generally." The idea that there could be such a thing is deeply misconceived.
117. Together, the free exercise and nonestablishment norms "minimize government
influence on religious choices." Laycock, supranote 89, at 45. But to answer the question "Is
it good that the two norms are part of our constitutional law?" by saying "Yes, because the
two norms minimize government influence on religious choice" is little helpful: To ask
whether it is good that the two norms are part of our constitutional law is the same as asking
whether it is good that our constitutional law minimizes government influence on religious
choices. And whatever the warrant for concluding that it is good that our constitutional law
minimizes government influence on religious choice is also the warrant for concluding that
it is good that the free exercise and nonestablishment norms are part of our constitutional law.
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the already quite weak establishment of religion (Christianity) effectuated by the
Irish Constitution-poses no credible threat to any person's conscience, whether the
conscience is religious or secular; in particular, it excludes no person from full and
equal citizenship in the political community, whether the person is a religious
believer or a religious agnostic or even an atheist. Indeed, the belief that we are all
inviolable, religious believers and nonbelievers alike-a belief that for many in the
United States is grounded on the belief that God created us and loves us-is the very
foundation not only of the general idea ofhuman rights but also of particular human
rights claims, including the claims that everyone's conscience must be respected and
that full and equal citizenship in the political community should not be conditioned
on one's religious belief or lack of it."'
We end, therefore, where we began: "Converging developments ...reveal with
ever sharper clarity the audacious gamble that underlies the American experiment.
The American republic simultaneously relies on ultimate beliefs (for otherwise it has
no right to the [human] rights by which it thrives), yet rejects any fixed, final, or
official formulation ofthem (for here the First Amendment is clearest, most original,
and most constructive). ' ." 9

118. See generallyPERY, supra note 107.
119. GUNNEss, supra note 1, at 18-19.

